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Abstract: The concept of total war is typically conceived of as the entirety of a nation’s or other 
belligerent’s resources and the spheres of non-combatant, civilian-centered life being drawn into 
the conflict. Total war also includes the methods of warfare being conducted with the intent of 
exhibiting complete destruction on an enemy’s forces and moral. Although total war in the 
Mexican Revolution is not typically, if ever, discussed in its historiography, I am arguing that the 
Mexican Revolution exhibited implementation of total war in its warfare, and therefore should be 
discussed in its historiography to similar degrees as that of the political and social aspects of the 
Revolution, which are generally focused on to a much greater degree. The form of total war 
exhibited in the Mexican Revolution manifests in three primary aspects: extreme, unnecessary 
violence perpetrated by and against the combatants of a conflict, the failure-either intentional or 
unintentional-to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in the warfare, and the 
often-coerced involvement of civilian resources, supplies, and lives in the conflict, resulting in 



























 La Decena Trágica, or the “Ten Tragic Days”, was a period of extreme violence and 
wanton destruction that occurred in México City between February 9 and 19, 1913. This event 
occurred in the midst of the wider seven-year armed conflict of the Mexican Revolution, 
specifically during the military coup instigated by counterrevolutionary forces intending to 
overthrow the reformist-minded government of Francisco I. Madero, who had led the call for 
populist revolt in 1910 and succeeded in being elected president in 1911. As described by a New 
York Times article from February 12, 1913 covering the third day of violence, “Fleeing citizens 
cut down. For hours big guns and rapid fires sweep streets of the capital. Witness of the fighting 
says bodies cover streets where fighting occurred. Shells wreck big buildings… The food supply 
in the capital is low. There is no milk or bread to be obtained, owing to the military activity in 
the city and the outskirts.”i The depiction of these events provided by this article offers perfect 
examples of the existence of total war both in the specific event of la Decena Trágica and in the 
Mexican Revolution as a whole. Due to the constraints of this paper, I will focus solely on the 
events of la Decena Trágica for this analysis, but actions exemplifying total war can be seen 
throughout the duration of the Mexican Revolution, to the point that I argue the Revolution 
should be viewed as a conflict of total war proportions.  
Despite the wealth of material on the subject, scholars of the Mexican Revolution have 
typically failed to categorize the Revolution in terms of total war conditions. Today, “total war” 
refers to a mass armed conflict that is “unrestricted in the weapons used, the territory or 
combatants involved, and/or the objectives pursued,”ii as well as involving the “complete 
mobilization of civilian and military resources and manpower for the war effort.”iii To prove the 
existence of total war during the Mexican Revolution, this paper will focus on the utilization of 
extreme and unnecessary violence by and against combatants, the perpetration of violence—
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either intentional or unintentional—against non-combatants, and the involvement or 
appropriation of the civilian resource supply for the war effort and the resulting toll it had on 
resources and civilians.  
Developing the Concept of Total War 
The Hague Convention 
 First, one has to have an understanding of what exactly total war is, particularly of how 
the concept was conceptualized at the time, to better understand how total war was thought of 
then and how it can be applied to this conflict. The Hague Convention of 1907 is used to develop 
this understanding. The Hague Convention was an international convention intended to define 
“the laws and customs of war on land” and bind all signatory nations to adhere to its code of 
conduct;iv the convention from 1907 was used to revise the earlier 1899 First Hague Peace 
Conference, which itself had been used to amend the laws and customs of war established by the 
Conference of Brussels in 1874.v The Hague Convention defined certain methods of warfare as 
illegal: given that these actions are defined as illegal, and thereby unjust, warfare, they constitute 
actions of total war. These methods included “treacherously”  killing or wounding opposing 
combatants, killing or wounding combatants who have surrendered, the utilization of “arms, 
projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering,” and the “destruction or seizure 
of the enemy’s property.”vi Although what constitutes “treacherous wounding” or “unnecessary 
suffering” was not exactly defined, numerous instances in which one or more of these methods 
occurred in la Decena Trágica will be used to show how excessive violence used between 
combatants, as well as violence against non-combatants, occurred throughout the event. 
Additionally, articles 25, 28, and 46 state that “attacks and bombardments of towns, villages, 
dwellings, or buildings which are undefended are prohibited”, that pillage of any place under any 
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circumstance is prohibited, and that family rights, human lives, and private property must be 
respected and are prohibited from confiscation.vii These articles allude to the forced involvement 
of the civilian sphere of life in a conflict, providing rules that were violated during la Decena 
Trágica and the Mexican Revolution as a whole.    
Background  
Beginning of the Mexican Revolution 
The Mexican Revolution began on October 5th, 1910 with the proclamation of the Plan de 
San Luis Potosí by Madero. Madero delivered the call for revolution with the intent of 
overthrowing the presidency of Porfirio Díaz, a former general in the Mexican Federal Army 
who had ruled México almost without interruption for 35 years. Díaz—whose presidency and 
governmental regime was referred to as El Porfiriato—ruled México essentially as a dictator, 
instituting extensive economic and political policies that helped to industrialize and modernize 
México’s economy and centralize the local, state, and federal governments under Díaz’s 
influence. These policies also served to exploit the labor of the urban working classes and rural, 
indigenous-based peasantry while benefitting México’s economic elite and Western imperial 
interests, in the manner of the neocolonialism that characterized much of Latin American politics 
and economics at the time. Additionally, Díaz was able to rule unopposed for so long largely 
because of his utilization of “carrot-and-stick” measures, negotiating political support, coveted 
positions in government, and economic benefits for politicians he approved of, while demoting, 
removing from power, or otherwise pressuring those who wouldn’t submit to his influence. Díaz 
also enjoyed great support from the military, due to his history as a renowned general, his scaling 
down of the military establishment to those generals who curried his favor, and the military’s 
inherently reactionary nature.   
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 Madero achieved a popular revolution upon the pronouncement and promulgation of his 
Plan de San Luis Potosí in late 1910, primarily gaining his support from serrano movements in 
northern México, like those of Francisco “Pancho” Villa and Pascual Orozco in Chihuahua, 
which followed the traditions of past rebellions by focusing on enhancing local autonomy, 
advancing agrarian and economic reform, and combatting the centralization of government 
propagated under El Porfiriato. He also gained additional support from agrarista movements in 
the south—like that of Emiliano Zapata—, which, also following previous trends of rebellion in 
the region, were focused almost exclusively on land reform and achieving greater land 
repatriation for peasants. Madero and those who answered his call succeeded in overthrowing 
Porfirio Díaz in May 1911, with Madero elected as president of México in the elections that 
followed in November.  
Although the second full year of revolution in México saw Madero’s advancement of the 
political reforms he’d promised with the Plan de San Luis Potosí, it was also marred by growing 
discontent with his lack of substantial economic and social reform, his inability to commit to 
either of the more conservative or radical elements vying for his support, and his decision to 
disband the revolutionary groups that helped him achieve power and instead rely on the military 
leaders and Federal Army that had fought against them. Thus, numerous rebellions emerged with 
the intent of overthrowing Madero and assuming control of the Mexican government. These 
included Emiliano Zapata’s agrarista rebellion, which turned on Madero to continue its fight for 
expanded agrarian reform; Pascual Orozco’s Orozquista’s, which also turned on Madero due to 
Orozco’s discontent with Madero’s failures in advancing radical policies and the lack of 
recognition he felt he received in helping overthrow Porfirio Díaz; and reactionary rebellions led 
by various conservative leaders, such as Bernardo Reyes—a former general in Porfirio Díaz’s 
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army and one-time political ally of Díaz—and Félix Díaz—Porfirio Díaz’s nephew—, who 
despised the reformist ideals espoused by Madero and the more radical revolutionaries involved 
in the overthrow of Porfirio Díaz.   
La Decena Trágica 
Widespread civil discontent turned to terrible violence in February 1913 with la Decena 
Trágica. Following failed rebellions in August and October 1912, respectively, both Bernardo 
Reyes and Félix Díaz were incarcerated at Lecumberri prison in México City. Due to the 
continued influence of Porfirismo—the ideological doctrine of Porfirio Díaz and his científico 
advisers—amongst the military command, they were able to plan and institute a coup with the 
assistance of many of the military forces stationed within the city.viii The coup commenced on 
the morning of February 9, with an attack on the National Palace by a force of rebel Federal 
soldiers led by Díaz and Reyes. The attack was ultimately a failure, resulting in the death of 
Reyes and the forced retreat of the remaining rebel Federal forces to La Ciudadela, an old 
arsenal a mile and a half away from the National Palace.ix Over the next ten days, much of the 
fighting would occur in this area. This first battle and the subsequent fighting in “The Tragic Ten 
Days” reveals instances in which non-combatants were either intentionally or accidentally 
targeted by the warring factions, as well as examples of destruction of civilian property and 
excessive violence perpetrated between combatants.  
Articles from three different news outlets, as well as historian Alan Knight’s The 
Mexican Revolution, Vol. I, will be used to analyze the events of la Decena Trágica. These are 
the Mexican-based Regeneración, created by “los Hermanos Flores Magón,” three reporters 
during the period of El Porfiriato who were well-known for their opposition to Porfirian politics 
and censorship of the press and their socialist and anarchist beliefs; the Mexican-American La 
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Prensa, published in San Antonio, Texas and which shows a more favorable bias towards the 
reactionary forces in its coverage of the events; and the U.S.-based New York Times, which 
doesn’t reveal a clear bias for either side in the conflict, but could hold a more conservative bias, 
given the U.S. government’s support for Porfirio Díaz and the economic interests of American 
investors and businessmen in México at the time. A New York Times article published on 
February 10, 1913 provides a description of the outbreak of fighting in front of the National 
Palace on the first day of la Decena Trágica, stating that “In this engagement, more than 300 
persons were killed. Most of them were non-combatants. A large crowd had gathered around the 
palace, and into the assemblage both sides fired.”x This version of the events is supported in the 
article from La Prensa, which reported that, “The assaulting troops gave several charges over the 
crowd that witnessed the fight, resulting in various deaths and injuries…In the battle that the 
belligerents sustained in front of the Palace, it is calculated that there were around 200 deaths.”xi 
Despite the differences in overall death toll, both accounts are further confirmed in Alan 
Knight’s analysis: “For some ten minutes the Zócalo became a battlefield: Reyes was shot dead 
along with 400 others, many of them civilian bystanders.”xii These accounts ultimately conclude 
that both the military rebels under Díaz’s command and the Federal soldiers under Madero 
committed violence against a non-combatant populace, a trend in the warfare that would be 
repeated throughout the rest of the Revolution.  
Additionally, fifteen military cadets and their commanding officer, General Ruiz, who 
had joined Félix Díaz in the attack on the National Palace, were captured and summarily 
executed by General Victoriano Huerta, who Madero appointed to head the Federal defense 
against the rebels.xiii Though the execution of captured foot soldiers and lower officers occurred 
in the first phase of the Revolution, the execution of a high-ranking and well-known general like 
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Ruiz represented an escalation in the brutality of the warfare of the Mexican Revolution, xiv  a 
shift which would be seen throughout the following phases of the Revolution. The execution of 
16 captured combatants by a Federal officer also represents a clear violation of Article 4 of the 
Hague Convention, which states that “[prisoners] must be humanely treated.”xv  These instances 
of deadly combat between soldiers and civilians caught in the crossfire provide insight into how 
the Mexican Revolution would reach conditions of total war, foreshadowing much of the 
escalation in violence and brutality that would be seen in the following days and years.  
The third day of fighting in la Decena Trágica saw the combatants continuing to commit 
acts of superfluous violence amongst themselves and against non-combatants, this time with the 
added element of destroying civilian property. A New York Times article covering the fighting 
noted that during the attack on La Ciudadela, “Heavy artillery were used on both sides, and the 
firing was directed without regard to the non-combatants in the streets or to the property of 
foreigners. The government losses are heavy. One estimate is over 1,000 killed and wounded 
[soldiers]. This is probably conservative. The loss among non-combatants is also heavy.”
xviii
xvi 
Articles from both Regeneración and La Prensa further reaffirm this form of close quarters 
combat within the city and the destructive effect it had on civilian life. Regeneración states that, 
“Transformed into crazy [persons], into brutes, the men of the [Federal] army have divided into 
two bands and, spewing thousands of grenades and cannonballs, have left México City in ruins 
and murdered thousands of men, women, and children,”xvii while La Prensa expresses “With the 
bombardment of La Ciudadela, many private residences have been destroyed, causing the deaths 
of countless persons.”  
These articles could be taken as sensationalistic, with the intent of embellishing their 
narratives in order to serve either their own biases or the interests of their leadership; however, 
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Alan Knight’s description confirms the authenticity of these accounts, noting that “On the 
morning of 11 February, government forces opened the attack on the Ciudadela with a massive 
artillery barrage (to which the rebels replied in kind) followed by waves of infantry; there were 
over 500 casualties, including many civilians.”xix Therefore, the use of heavy artillery in such 
confined quarters as city streets indicates a clear intent to injure and murder as much of the 
enemy as possible. Article 23 of the Hague Convention declares the use of arms, projectiles, or 
materials calculated to cause unnecessary suffering to be prohibited,xx and the use of artillery in 
this scenario certainly fits that bill. Furthermore, the evidence gleaned from all four accounts 
indicates that these weren’t mere accidental killings of a few non-combatant bystanders, but that 
both the Federal Army and the military rebels under Díaz’s command showed an explicit lack of 
care in securing the safety of nearby non-combatants, resulting in the deaths of many innocent 
people.  
The article from La Prensa also observed that, after the artillery barrage on La 
Ciudadela, “The city is found without lighting and a panicked terror overcomes the inhabitants. 
The electric streetcars don’t circulate, and only the ambulances working to collect the dead and 
injured pass through the streets.”xxi Instances like these are further corroborated by the passage 
from the New York Times article cited in the introduction, which noted severe drops in the food 
supply throughout the capital by the third day of fighting, and Alan Knight’s account: “Shells 
were lobbed across the city centre, machine-gun fire raked chic residential and commercial 
streets. The lamp-posts leaned, and festoons of telegraph wire draped themselves across deserted 
plazas. Rubble and corpses strewed the streets, and between them dodged ‘Buen Tono vans, 
acting as makeshift ambulances…Fresh food became scarce, prices shot up, and some people—it 
was later said—dined on dog and cat.”xxii The failure of the city’s electricity, the deteriorating 
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food supply, and the loss of other civil sources reveal how the strain on civilian resources 
became a central theme during la Decena Trágica, a theme which would be repeated and even 
amplified as time went on and the Revolution intensified. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this particular event of la Decena Trágica and the wider conflict during 
which it occurred exists as an example in which the concept of total war manifested on multiple 
levels. Through the examination of the degree of violence utilized by combatants, the failure to 
differentiate between combatants and non-combatants in warfare, and the complete absorption of 
civilian resources and other areas of life, it becomes apparent that the Mexican Revolution was 
an armed conflict unrestricted in its methods of combat, in its willingness to impose violence on 
non-combatants, and in its ability to drag the entirety of civilian life into its fronts. There are 
numerous reasons as to why the Revolution escalated to a conflict of total war proportions, 
including the greater implementation of heavier weaponry and more brutal military tactics and 
the extended duration of the Revolution. However, after examining various sources, it becomes 
apparent that one of the biggest factors in producing total war in the Revolution was the 
ideological differences that existed between the various revolutionary forces and the 
counterrevolutionary elements that opposed them.  
In the case of la Decena Trágica, it was each side’s contrasting ideology and their 
differing beliefs in governing Mexican society that largely led to the deterioration into total war. 
Both Reyes and Felix Díaz had attained military and political power during Porfirio Díaz’s rule, 
and therefore retained much belief in the Porfirian order of society and much opposition to views 
that challenged this order. When Madero’s coalition of reformist-minded revolutionaries rose up 
to overthrow El Porfiriato and bring change to Mexican society, Reyes and Díaz viewed their 
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movement and the new government as invalid, believing them to be enemies of the correct 
manner of governance and order for the country. As such, they engaged in revolt themselves, and 
committed to defeating Madero as swiftly and absolutely as possible, in order to return civil 
order to the country. On the other side, Madero had led the charge against Porfirio Díaz and 
spent the better part of a year engaged in open revolt, fighting for the return of democracy and 
fair elections, elections that had just won him the presidency himself. To have his success 
followed by Porfirian rebels attempting to overthrow him and bring back—in Madero’s eyes—
the style of dictatorship he had just fought to bring down, meant the potential ruin of everything 
the revolutionaries had struggled so hard to gain. Thus, Madero committed to crushing the rebels 
as quickly and fully as they had with him. It was a power struggle, that is certain, but it was a 
power struggle involving differences in sets of motives, forms of governance, and ideas over the 
future of Mexican society. This form of power struggle would be repeated throughout the 
subsequent phases of the Mexican Revolution, in the case of the year-long civil war from 1913-
1914 between Victoriano Huerta’s counterrevolutionary Federal Army and Venustiano 
Carranza’s Constitutionalist forces, and the second civil war from 1915-1917, involving 









“Army Revolts, Seizes México City; Madero’s Troops Hold the Palace; 300 Are Slain in the 
 First Clash.” New York Times. February 1913, 1-2. Retrieved from    
 https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1913/02/10/issue.html. 
“El epilogo de la gran tragedia revolucionaria parece estar muy cercano.” La Prensa. February 
 1913, 1. Retrieved from https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045395/1913-02-
 13/ed-1/seq-1/.  
“El Gobierno Maderista ha Muerto.” Regeneración.  February 1913, 1. Retrieved from 
 http://archivomagon.net/wp-content/uploads/e4n129.pdf.   
Knight, Alan. The Mexican Revolution, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.   
“Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague, IV).” Accessed February 15, 2020. 
 https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000001-0631.pdf. 
“Madero Spurns Offer of Mediation and Opens Attack on Foe.” New York Times. February 1913, 
 1. Retrieved from    
 https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1913/02/12/100388297.html?pageNum
 ber=1. 
Reed, John. Insurgent Mexico. New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1969.  
“Total war.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed June 12, 2020. 
 https://www.britannica.com/topic/total-war. 
Verniest 12 
“Total war.” Oxford Reference. Accessed June 12, 2020. 
 https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199891580.001.0001/acref-














i  “Madero Spurns Offer of Mediation and Opens Attack on Foe,” New York Times, February 1913, 1. 
Retrieved from https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1913/02/12/100388297.html?pageNumber=1. 
 
ii  “Total war,” Oxford Reference, accessed June 12, 2020, 
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199891580.001.0001/acref-9780199891580-e-8377. 
 
iii  The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, “Total war,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed June 12, 2020, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/total-war. 
 
iv  “Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague, IV),” Article 1, accessed February 15, 2020, 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000001-0631.pdf.  
v  “Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907,” International Committee of the Red Cross, 
accessed May 11, 2020, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195. 
 
vi  “Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague, IV),” Article 23. 
 
vii  “Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague, IV),” Articles 25, 28, 46.  
 
viii  Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 480-483. 
 
ix  Knight, 482.  
 
x  “Army Revolts, Seizes México City; Madero’s Troops Hold the Palace; 300 Are Slain in the First Clash,” 
New York Times, February 1913, 1-2. Retrieved from 
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1913/02/10/issue.html. 
 
xi  “El epilogo de la gran tragedia revolucionaria parece estar muy cercano,” La Prensa, February 1913, 1. 
Retrieved from https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045395/1913-02- 13/ed-1/seq-1/. 
 
xii  Knight, 482.  
 
xiii  Knight, 483.  
 
xiv  Knight, 483.  
 
xv  “Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague, IV),” Article 4.  
 
xvi  “Madero spurns offer”, 1. 
 
xvii  “El Gobierno Maderista ha Muerto,” Regeneración, February 1913, 1. Retrieved from 
http://archivomagon.net/wp-content/uploads/e4n129.pdf. 
 
xviii  “El epilogo,” 1. 
 
xix  Knight, 483.  
 




xxi  “El epilogo,” 1.  
 
xxii  Knight, 484.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Verniest 2 
 
 
